Although the dissent seeks to appropriate the term stare decisis for its own use, the dissent in this case does not honor its principles. (footnote omitted). This Court applied that exception to the automobile context in Belton, the holding of which rested in large part on the assumption that articles inside a vehicle's passenger compartment are "generally ... within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach.' Under the facts of this case, the justification for permitting a warrantless search incident to arrest does not apply to a locked safe inside an unoccupied vehicle.

The experience of the 28 years since we decided Belton has shown that the generalization underpinning the broad reading of that decision is unfounded. Relying on the fact that the police saw Gant commit the crime of driving without a license and apprehended him only shortly after he exited his car, the court held that the search was permissible as a search incident to arrest. For several reasons, we reject the State's argument. Fidelity to underlying constitutional values, for instance, is not a criterion, nor is analytical soundness, nor the right sizing of any rule that might be adopted. All rights reserved. at 481; see also Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 267 (“The degree to which we follow United States Supreme Court precedent, or any other precedent, depends solely upon its ability to persuade us with the reasoning of the decision.”).26. Reversing, the State Supreme Court distinguished New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454--which held that police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle and any containers therein as a contemporaneous incident of a recent occupant's lawful arrest--on the ground that it concerned the scope of a search incident to arrest but did not answer the question whether officers may conduct such a search once the scene has been secured. Despite this explicit statement, the opinion of the Court in the present case curiously suggests that Belton may reasonably be read as adopting a holding that is narrower than the one explicitly set out in the Belton opinion, namely, that an officer arresting a vehicle occupant may search the passenger compartment "when the passenger compartment is within an arrestee's reaching distance."

After Thornton, however, it remained unclear where the stopping point might be. In Short, we cited Williams in supporting the Ochoa holding that in the development of independent state constitutional law, the value of federal precedent depended solely upon its persuasive force. 629, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 1342 (Cal.1976) (Clark, J., dissenting) (“Our deference toward the United States Supreme Court is fast becoming a shell game․ Today, because it happens to coincide with their own view, the majority resort to mere dictum in the plurality opinion․”); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal.3d 101, 127 Cal.Rptr. This we decline to do. 2d 947, 961 (1994) (same). Summary. In our prior cases debating the use of such criteria, the State had been blindsided by the majority's departure from settled federal precedent and thus had no reason to urge divergence criteria. 41(d)(3) (authorizing federal magistrates to issue warrants “based on information communicated by telephone or other reliable electronic means”); id. As the special concurrence notes, a federal trial court in the southern district of Iowa has noted that it may take police as little as twenty minutes to obtain a search warrant by telephone. at 1990, 114 L.Ed.2d at 632 (promulgating a rule for the warrantless search of vehicles and containers, reiterating “the virtue of providing clear and unequivocal guidelines to the law enforcement profession” (internal quotation marks omitted)). I also agree with Justice Stevens, however, that the rule can produce results divorced from its underlying Fourth Amendment rationale. The dissent takes a position on the merits of the application of the automobile exception under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution to this case. Additionally, William Cuddihy, in his magisterial volume on the history of the Fourth Amendment, concluded that the “warrant preference” approach to the text—the approach we embraced in Short—was the most consistent with the founders' intentions. 530 U. S., at 443. While we have resisted any formula for constitutional adjudication, our caselaw amply illuminates the manner in which various authorities may contribute to the development of independent state constitutional law. In 2004, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor expressed concern that, after Belton, “lower court decisions seem[ed] ․ to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception [to the warrant requirement].” Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624, 124 S.Ct. 2d 673, 678, 541 N. E. 2d 40, 43 (1989); State v. Fesler, 68 Ore. App.

Perhaps, by taking the case, the Supreme Court has signaled its intention to clarify this increasingly murky area of Fourth Amendment law. When a constitutional claim is made but neither the State nor Federal Constitution is specifically identified, we consider the claim preserved under both the State and Federal Constitutions. We approve Gant's “reaching distance” rationale as an appropriate limitation on the scope of searches incident to arrest under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution because that limitation is faithful to the underlying justifications for warrantless searches incident to arrest. The majority effectively eliminates searches incident to arrest in the automobile context. 453 U. S., at 456. Even if police lack a valid warrant, they may search a vehicle if they have probable cause to believe a crime, or evidence thereof, may be found within it. We have never relied on stare decisis to justify the continuance of an unconstitutional police practice. Contrary to the State's suggestion, a broad reading of Belton is also unnecessary to protect law enforcement safety and evidentiary interests. We now know that articles inside the passenger compartment are rarely within the area into which an arrestee might reach, and blind adherence to Belton's faulty assumption would authorize myriad unconstitutional searches. Young, 863 N.W.2d at 281. 80-328, p. 3 (hereinafter Brief in No. The New Jersey court rejected Belton because Belton wrote “out of the [SITA] exception the two Chimel justifications ․ [and] reached a result that is detached from established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” Id. See generally Mark S. Cady, The Vanguard of Equality: The Iowa Supreme Court's Journey to Stay Ahead of the Curve on an Arc Bending Towards Justice, 76 Alb. EDMS is not, and in all likelihood will not be, a 24/7 virtual magistrate. A number of state supreme courts have announced they may use certain criteria in evaluating claims under state constitutional law. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. Id. 2034, 2035, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 688 (1969). at 1723, 173 L.Ed.2d at 501.

80-328, at 7-8. Following precedent, moreover, saves lawyers and judges from having to rethink every legal question from the ground up whenever a question arises. As will be seen below, however, the central criteria to determine the proper approach under the Iowa Constitution should not be compliance with some kind of artificial checklist or neutral criteria designed to inhibit this court's range of constitutional options under the Iowa Constitution. Members of this court have disagreed about the semicolon's significance. Docket for Arizona v. Gant (FindLaw's Supreme Court Center) State Court's Opinion in the Case (FindLaw's Supreme Court Center) Case Outlining Boundaries of Searches Incident to Arrest (FindLaw) Search and Seizure Laws (provided by the Law Offices of Bruce Margolin) Content for You .

Gant, 556 U.S. at 350–51, 129 S.Ct. Chimel did not involve the search of a vehicle; rather, police arrested the defendant in his home and “then looked through the entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, and a small workshop.” Id. Today's departure from Gant cannot be justified under the Norgaard criteria or the criteria proposed by the State. at 2862, 69 L.Ed.2d at 772 (internal quotation marks omitted). The battle over whether criteria should be considered hard substantive criteria or soft advocacy criteria may be seen in two of the leading criteria states, New Jersey and Washington. The Question Raised by Gant, the Case the Court Has Agreed to Hear. Contrary to that claim, the narrow reading of Belton we adopt today is precisely the result Gant has urged. 851 N.W.2d at 501 (citing Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search–And–Seizure History: Now–Forgotten Common–Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due Process of Law,” 77 Miss. We have rejected wholesale importation of federal law.

We do not agree with the contention in Justice Alito's dissent (hereinafter dissent) that consideration of police reliance interests requires a different result. The special concurrence—based on its selective view of Iowa history—maintains that two of the framers of the 1857 Constitution “do not seem to be the kind of persons” who would favor judicial deference to United States Supreme Court interpretations of identical Iowa constitutional provisions. Even if the majority were correct in concluding that the automobile exception was not adequately raised below, we “will uphold a ruling of the court on the admissibility of evidence on any ground appearing in the record, whether urged below or not.” State v. Parker, 747 N.W.2d 196, 208 (Iowa 2008) (quoting State v. McCowen, 297 N.W.2d 226, 227 (Iowa 1980)). See Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical Reexamination of Chimel and Belton, 2002 Wis. L. Rev. For the reasons to be given below, the Constitution requires the Court to practice stare decisis.

The Chimel Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stewart, overruled these cases. So reads Article 2, Section 8 of the Arizona constitution — Arizona's answer to the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution. In Short, for instance, we cited the work of Thomas Y. Davies, who has encouraged state supreme courts to engage in authentic search and seizure historical analysis to avoid unoriginal use of reasonableness that engages in relativistic balancing.

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