alleged that the two districts concentrated a majority of black voters , (1969) (emphasis added).

42 U.S.C. Accordingly, the State devised a redistricting plan that created one majority-black district. In Gingles, the Court considered a multimember redistricting plan for the North Carolina State Legislature.

The creation of a majority-black district makes up for centuries of discrimination.

In a 5-4 decision, the Court found that when it comes to redrawing voting districts, race could   [509 U.S. 630, 9] U.S. 30, 46 madison_gaona. To allow judicial interference whenever this occurs would be to invite constant and unmanageable intrusion. , n. 18 (1973) - but because they are objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines. Even Members of the Court least inclined to approve of race-based remedial measures have acknowledged the significance of this factor. 1973c (neither a declaratory judgment by the District Court for the District of Columbia nor preclearance by the Attorney General "shall bar process. A. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? . ] Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires a covered jurisdiction to demonstrate either to the Attorney General or to the District Court that each new districting plan "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race[,] color, or [membership in a language minority.]" 31 shaw v reno 1993 13 facts of the case the us. 507 Hirabayashi v. United States, The state appellees suggest that a covered jurisdiction may have a compelling interest in creating majority-minority districts in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act. 420 See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. "Dilution" thus refers to the effects of districting decisions not on an individual's political power viewed in isolation, but on the political power of a group. It does so by glossing over the striking similarities, focusing on surface differences, most notably the (admittedly unusual) shape of the newly created district, See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. 488 U.S., at 491 served by the particular districts," id., at 142. [ 429 See, e.g., Croson, supra,, at 509 (plurality opinion). See Powers v. Ohio, And interestingly, those are counties of relatively small population in the northeastern part of the State. Test. to Brief for Federal Appellees 16a. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in the area of redistricting and racial gerrymandering. warrants an analysis different from that used in assessing the Robinson O. Everett: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: As our complaint seeks to make clear, this case poses the basic issue of how far a legislature may go in seeking to guarantee the election to Congress of persons of a … was necessary to avoid dilution of black voting strength in violation [509 U.S. 630, 19] not be the deciding factor. See Personnel Administrator of Mass.

Most of the black population is concentrated in the east and in the Piedmont, that is to say, along the coast and in the center of the State. JUSTICE SOUTER apparently views racial gerrymandering of the type presented here as a special category of "benign" racial discrimination that should be subject to relaxed judicial review. Nothing in the decision precludes white voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification. I have no doubt that a State's compliance with the Voting Rights Act clearly constitutes a compelling interest. U.S. 367, 385 The case involved the redistricting of North Carolina after the 1990 census. UJO's framework simply does not apply where, as here, a reapportionment plan is alleged to be so irrational on its face that it immediately offends principles of racial equality.

. . The Court expresses no view on whether appellants successfully But it soon became apparent that guaranteeing equal access to the polls would not suffice to root out other racially discriminatory voting practices. [509 U.S. 630, 8] The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is . 412 Because of an increase in population, the state was entitled to an additional seat in the United States House of No inquiry into legislative purpose is necessary when the racial classification appears on the face of the statute. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Turner, Thomas G.. Hungar, and Jessica Dunsay Silver. Footnote 4 being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The jurisdiction must obtain either a judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia declaring that the proposed change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color" or administrative preclearance from the Attorney General. classification, Richmond v. J. But their loose and imprecise use by today's majority has, I fear, led it astray.

(referring variously to "strict scrutiny," "the standard of review employed in Wygant," and "heightened scrutiny"); id., at 520 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) ("strict scrutiny"); id., at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (classifications "`must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives'") (quoting Regents of Univ. Washington Post Apr. >Accord, Loving v. Virginia, . The Act proved immediately successful in ensuring racial minorities access to the voting booth; by the early 1970's, the spread between black and white registration in several of the targeted Southern States had fallen to well below 10%. With these considerations in mind, we have limited such claims by insisting upon a showing that "the political processes . As UJO held, a State is entitled to take such action. [509 U.S. 630, 1]. Given two districts drawn on similar, race-based grounds, the one does not become more injurious than the other simply by virtue of being snake like, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned and absent any evidence of differential racial impact. Gaffney,

  See Richmond v. J.A.

476 U.S. 267

U.S. 130, 141

(1983), Gomillion v. Lightfoot, Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy. to Juris. The Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO. 4 The States certainly have a very strong interest in complying with federal antidiscrimination laws that are constitutionally valid as interpreted and as applied. Before us, the state appellees contend that the General Assembly's revised plan was necessary not to prevent retrogression, but to avoid dilution of black voting strength in violation of 2, as construed in Thornburg v. Gingles,

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